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From Individual Neurons to Social Brains
aspects of human development that differ from those 
of other animals as a result of our uniquely extended 
ontogenetic schedule.
A central question in early prehistory, with its 
limited archaeological record comprised largely of 
stones and bones, is how stone tool use relates to 
cognition, and how lithic evidence can be used to 
inform on the evolution of distinctively human forms 
of thought. At the heart of this debate is the issue of 
whether stone tool use is a result of or a stimulus to a 
more flexible intelligence, and for this reason we ask 
whether social interaction precedes and surrounds 
tool use or whether, in certain circumstances, the arte-
facts themselves act as the media of social interaction 
(e.g. Mithen 2000a; Henshilwood et al. 2001; Wynn 
2002, and comments thereafter). These are not mutu-
ally exclusive solutions — any one single monolithic 
scheme for the evolution of tool behaviour would 
underestimate the complexity of such behaviour in 
both modern humans and other animals (Beck 1980; 
Whiten et al. 1999; 2005). Nevertheless, it is a useful 
heuristic to imagine tools as being not only products 
of certain social behaviours but also as potential rein-
forcers of such behaviours (Gosden 2005; Gosden & 
Marshall 1999).
Gosden (2005), building upon an argument initi-
ated by Gell (1998), has been a strong proponent of 
the argument that artefacts might possess an agency 
independent of their makers. Examining recurrent 
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The manufacture of stone tools is an integral part of the human evolutionary trajectory. 
However, very little research is directed towards the social and cognitive context of the 
process of manufacture. This article aims to redress this balance by using insights from 
contemporary neuroscience. Addressing successively more inclusive levels of analysis, 
we will argue that the relevant unit of analysis when examining the interface between 
archaeology and neuroscience is not the individual neuron, nor even necessarily the 
individual brain, but instead the socio-cognitive context in which brains develop and tools 
are manufactured and used. This context is inextricably linked to the development of unique 
ontogenetic scheduling, as evidenced by the fossil record of evolving hominin lineages.
In this article we will argue that the relevant unit 
of analysis when examining the interface between 
archaeology and neuroscience is not the individual 
neuron, nor even necessarily the individual brain, but 
instead the socio-cognitive context in which brains 
develop and tools are manufactured and used. This is 
not to say that the burgeoning field of neuroanatomy 
is not important to archaeology: far from it. Studies 
shedding light on the neural processes underlying 
behaviour can hardly fail to impact on research into 
ancient cognition. Nevertheless, we wish to stress 
that such a fine­grained examination of the individual 
brain is relevant to archaeology only within a wider 
physical and social context. The data available fol-
lowing recent advances in neuroscience are most 
significant archaeologically for examining the wider 
cognitive adaptations that have made humans highly 
social, tool­making animals. 
Beginning with the finest level of analysis, that 
of the individual brain and its specific neural com-
ponents, this article will address successively more 
inclusive levels of analysis that stress the importance 
of context by situating the brain in the body — the 
level at which individual acts of tool use are tradition-
ally investigated by the archaeologist. We conclude by 
examining the individual body in its context of multi-
ple and interacting brains, bodies and tools, focusing 
on the importance of development within the human 
social milieu. Particular attention will be paid to those 
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forms in the pottery of Roman Britain, Gosden argues 
that, once given form by a manufacturer, an artefact 
imposes its own rules on the future production of 
similar forms. In a sense, a norm is produced during 
a certain initial phase to which future artefacts must 
conform in order to be regarded as appropriate for a 
particular function. This conformity is, at least in part, 
enforced by previous ‘generations’ of similar objects.
While we are not convinced that artefacts them-
selves possess agency when divorced from their mak-
ers, we do see evidence in the archaeological record 
of embedded social processes that are necessarily 
repetitive or ‘normalized’ in nature. Almost without 
fail these processes involved the interaction of several 
individuals and were mediated by the artefacts that 
were manufactured and used. It is in the reconstruc-
tion of the specific neural functions involved in these 
interactions that we feel neuroscience has most to offer 
archaeologists. In particular, three recently discovered 
classes of neurons would seem to offer considerable 
insights into the complex socio-cognitive web of 
technological evolution that we envisage.
Individual brains
At the finest level of analysis — that of individual 
neurons — three recently discovered classes of 
neurons are of particular interest to the archaeolo-
gist in elucidating the links between cognition, tool 
behaviour and the social world. These are bimodal, 
mirror and canonical neurons, and are discussed 
individually below. 
Bimodal neurons
Bimodal neurons respond to information from both 
the somatosensory Receptive Field (sRF) and the 
visual Receptive Field (vRF) adjacent to it (Maravita et 
al. 2001; 2002; 2003; Maravita & Iriki 2004). Distal type 
bimodal neurons (DBNs) code for information from 
the hand area and, crucially, are not only activated by 
objects within the immediate grasp of the hand but also 
register changes within the area of space that hand can 
potentially reach given the arm’s current position and 
orientation. Proximal type bimodal neurons (PBNs) 
code for similar information from the shoulder area 
(Fig. 1); the area covered by the vRF encompasses 
everything within reach of the hand — including those 
areas that the hand could reach via movement of the 
arm. Bimodal neurons thus allow for the anticipation 
of interaction with objects; the signature of anticipation, 
as depicted in the activation patterns of these neurons, 
is identical to that which occurs during the execution 
of the actions themselves.
For an archaeologist, the significance of bimodal 
neurons is that the areas for which they code are 
extended by the use of tools. For example, the PBNs 
of a macaque allowed to use a simple rake in order to 
retrieve food code for the area immediately encom-
passing the hand and the rake, whilst the monkey’s 
DBNs code for the total area within reach of the arm/
rake (Maravita & Iriki 2004). The neural information 
regarding the action capabilities of the hand and arm 
in space is therefore directly modified by the use of 
tools. In this way, tool use can be seen to have direct, 
rapid effects on the way in which the brain represents 
the capabilities of the body in space, demonstrating 
a level of plasticity in this area that is clearly hugely 
relevant to the investigation of links between the 
evolution of the human intellect and the manufacture 
and use of tools.
The nature of the tool itself is also vital to the 
extension of the body image in the brain. Use of an 
unsuccessful tool, or the passive holding of a perfectly 
useable tool, will not extend the area coded for by 
bimodal neurons. The monkey must experience suc-
cessful tool use in order for the neurons to assimilate 
the new­found capability. However, short periods of 
tool use — on the order of five minutes — are suf-
ficient. The effects of tools are also transient; further 
Figure 1. Distal-type bimodal neurons related to the 
hand area (A) code not only for objects in contact with 
the hand (the somatosensory Receptive Field), but also 
for the area immediately surrounding the hand (the 
visual Receptive Field). The vRF is extended during tool 
use (B), but not during passive holding of the tool (C). 
Proximal-type bimodal neurons related to the shoulder 
area (D) code for a vRF that radiates from the shoulder, as 
well as the sRF of currently accessible objects. Proximal-
type neuron codings for the vRF are also extended during 
tool use (E). (Redrawn after Maravita & Iriki 2004, 80.)
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activity without the tool quickly returns the body 
image to its normal state (Maravita & Iriki 2004). The 
modification of the area to which bimodal neurons 
respond is therefore both temporary and dependent 
on the tool being useful in the attainment of a particu-
lar goal (i.e. reaching for an object). Modification of the 
body image during tool use is thus context-depend-
ent, suggesting that neural substrates serving tool 
behaviour are sensitive to inputs beyond the level of 
the individual brain. 
Mirror neurons
Mirror neurons have received considerably more 
attention in the literature beyond neuroscience than 
bimodal neurons, with which they share certain 
features. Mirror neurons are so­called because they 
fire both when an agent executes a particular action 
and when that agent observes (or hears, Kohler et al. 
2002; Gazzola et al. 2006) another agent executing the 
same action (Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). Discov-
ered initially in the premotor cortex (area F5) of the 
macaque (Rizzolatti et al. 1996; Gallese et al. 1996), the 
human mirror system includes, but is not necessarily 
limited to, the insula, amygdala, limbic system and 
supratemporal sulcus (Iriki 2006, 3). 
The direct homologue of the macaque F5 region 
in humans is Broca’s area, which has inevitably led to 
speculation regarding the role of the mirror system 
in the evolution of vocalization, speech and language 
(Arbib & Rizzolatti 1997; Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998; 
Arbib 2002). Indeed, there has been much speculation 
about the potential role of the mirror neuron system 
as a basic mechanism underpinning many aspects 
of human social cognition including empathy and, 
potentially, theory of mind. Essentially, the posses-
sion of ‘theory of mind’ (a phrase coined by Premack 
& Woodruff (1978) during speculations about inter-
personal cognition in chimpanzees), allows an agent 
to appreciate that another may have thoughts and 
desires different from his own. In human children, 
this appreciation is found to be present from the age 
of approximately three and a half years (Wimmer & 
Perner 1983; Gopnik & Astington 1988).
It is argued that mirror neurons may be vital 
to the development of a theory of mind since they 
allow an agent to predict (or, perhaps more accu-
rately to ‘retrodict’) another’s thought processes via 
their behaviour (Hesslow 2002). This amounts to 
the simplistic process of putting oneself in another’s 
shoes and asking ‘What would I do in that situation?’ 
(prediction of action from thought) or ‘Which thoughts 
would have caused me to act like that? (retrodiction 
of thought from action). This is clearly an important 
skill in social situations, and one which is sometimes 
argued to have sparked the so-called ‘big bang’ of 
human culture (Mithen 2000a; Ramachandran n.d.). 
Canonical neurons
The final class of neurons discussed here, canonical 
neurons, is often thought of as part of a package 
with mirror neurons, as both are located in area F5 
of the premotor cortex. Whilst there are functional 
similarities, however, there are also some important 
differences. Canonical neurons are activated during 
the execution of goal-related movements and during 
object observation, where coding is specific to the type 
of grip required to interact with the object (Grèzes & 
Decety 2002; Grèzes et al. 2003; Pacherie & Dokic 2006). 
For example, a small, light object that would require 
a precision finger grip to lift activates a particular set 
of neurons, whilst a larger, heavier object, requiring a 
stronger whole­hand grip, activates a different set. In 
this way an object is assessed for a potential interaction 
pattern before tactile contact is made. Such a process 
is obviously highly goal-dependant; for example, it 
requires a quite different level of precision to pick up 
a pencil from among a collection of fifty than it does 
to sweep them all onto the floor. It could be suggested 
that canonical neurons allow the monkey to evaluate 
what, in Gibsonian terms, a given object affords (e.g. 
Gibson 1979); on the basis of these affordances and 
the individual’s goals, it then shapes the appropriate 
hand and/or arm movements. The aforementioned 
area F5 of the premotor cortex as well as the anterior 
intraparietal area are both thought to be implicated 
in this process of translation from object appearance 
to potential action (Jeannerod et al. 1995; Rizzolatti & 
Fadiga 1998; Grèzes et al. 2003).
In short, canonical neurons are capable of rep-
resenting not only goal-directed actions (in much the 
same way as mirror neurons) but also the potential 
for such actions based on the objects to hand. Thus, 
in the same sense that bimodal neurons do not code 
for regions of extension for a tool when that tool is 
ineffective, mirror and canonical neurons do not fire 
when basic actions are observed. They are both highly 
goal-dependent; in the case of mirror neurons those 
goals can be the goals of another agent, whilst in the 
case of canonical neurons the physical requirements 
of the goal are identified before (or even in the absence 
of) execution.
Bimodal, mirror, and canonical neurons: the three 
systems together
In summary, it seems that mirror neurons are con-
cerned with the goal-directed behaviours of the self 
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and others, canonical neurons relate to the potential 
for and specific requirements of interaction with 
an object, and bimodal neurons are associated with 
the spatial sphere of influence of a given system of 
agent plus object. By examining the links between 
the activities subserved by these three functional 
groups of neurons, we can begin to examine evolving 
systems of interacting agents and objects of the kind 
represented in the archaeological record. These sepa-
rate but related neuronal systems are likely to have 
evolved to facilitate an agent’s interactions with both 
inanimate objects and other agents: thus new data 
from recent advances in neuroimaging technology 
inform on the evolution of the cognitive capacity for 
tool behaviour itself, as well as the advantages that 
tool use might subsequently confer in other areas of 
the cognitive domain. However, significant as these 
neural mechanisms may be, they need to be placed in 
the evolutionary context of individuals engaged from 
the first in multiple ongoing social interactions which 
have equally important ramifications for the develop-
ment and transmission of tool behaviours.
Technology and the brain in society:  
imitation, simulation, and theory of mind
The majority of the early hominin archaeological 
record is composed of stone tools. Some aspects of 
these tools change with time and across space whilst 
others persist and are widely distributed in the 
archaeological record. What mechanisms might con-
tribute to the transmission of these tool ‘types’ between 
toolmakers? Considerable evidence is available from 
neuroscientific studies of primates and humans; for 
example, imitation is central to sophisticated social 
learning processes because, unlike emulation or social 
facilitation, imitation necessarily involves the cause-
and­effect understanding of a specific action as a means 
to an end — an understanding that Johnson­Frey (2003; 
2004) has suggested may be of particular importance 
in human tool behaviour.
The scale of imitation seen in humans appears 
greater than that of other great apes, a difference 
which manifests relatively early in development. 
Horner & Whiten (2005) showed that, when an experi-
menter removed a prize from a simple ‘puzzle box’ 
by performing a series of causally irrelevant actions 
followed by a series of necessary actions, juvenile 
chimps allowed access to the box performed only the 
necessary actions to retrieve the prize, while human 
children performed all the actions. While such fine­
grained ‘over­imitation’ may at first appear to be a 
handicap in achieving the necessary goal, it could be 
argued that faithful reproduction of others’ actions 
may be vital during the learning of detailed, precision 
skills such as flint knapping.
This capacity for imitation may also be present in 
primates other than the great apes. Iriki (2006) found 
that, among macaques, those that could be trained to 
use tools were afterwards more capable of imitating 
other behaviours. She suggests that this latent capac-
ity, which is rarely expressed in the wild, is released 
among primates through habitual tool behaviour, 
to the subsequent benefit of other socio­cognitive 
domains (Iriki 2006, 660). The potential implications 
for hominin evolution in the context of tool use are 
clear: with specific cognitive mechanisms liberated 
by the advent of stone tool behaviour from at least 
2.6 million years ago (Semaw 2000; Semaw et al. 2003), 
human technological abilities have blossomed to 
produce more varied and complex forms of material 
culture than those of any other species.
As mentioned briefly above, a capability of 
modern Homo sapiens often considered crucial to our 
cultural development is the possesion of a theory of 
mind (ToM) (Mithen 1998; 2000b; Brüne & Brüne­
Cohrs 2006), the ability to attribute mental states to 
ourselves and to appreciate that these may conflict 
with those of others. There is disagreement, however, 
as to the way in which this ‘theory’ develops and is 
implemented. Some researchers believe that ToM is 
literally a theory in the scientific sense; according to 
the somewhat unfortunately named ‘theory theory’, 
we accrue empirical knowledge of others via social 
experience, and gradually extrapolate general rules 
from consistencies in the data we accumulate, build-
ing along the way a theory of other minds (Carruthers 
1996). Alternatively, ‘simulation theory’ suggests that 
we employ the far more pragmatic heuristic of simply 
using our own minds as models for those of others. In 
other words, we internally simulate likely outcomes 
based on our own experiences (Gordon 1986; 1996).
A potential benefit of the simulation theory is 
that it would allow the repeated simulation of trial-
and-error alternatives without the expensive trials and 
potentially dangerous errors, offering a considerable 
selective advantage (Hesslow 2002, 244; Fig. 2). The 
discovery of mirror neurons may also provide us with 
a clear neural mechanism for simulation (Gallese & 
Goldman 1998). Adopting the perspective of another 
agent — simulation in the basic sense — is the covert, 
mental equivalent of the cognitive process involved 
at the overt level in imitation. As we have seen above, 
investigations of the properties of mirror neurons have 
provided a key insight into imitative processes. The 
existence of mirror neurons could thus be argued to 
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support simulation theory over the alternative (Gal-
lese & Goldman 1998; Hesslow 2002).
It is also interesting to note in this context that 
a predominant explanation for autistic spectrum 
disorders (ASDs) suggests they are due to deficiencies 
in the neural substrates that support social cognition 
(Baron­Cohen et al. 1985; Baron­Cohen 1995; Happé 
1994a,b). It is therefore no surprise that a number of 
researchers have hypothesized there may be a link 
between mirror neurons and autism (Hamilton et al. 
2007; Oberman et al. 2005; Oberman & Ramachandran 
2007; Williams et al. 2001; 2006). One recent study on 
imitation in ASD patients has shown that, when asked 
to copy experimenters holding their hands up with the 
palms facing away from their body, autistic subjects 
tended to hold their palms towards themselves — re­
creating the view of the hands they had seen instead of 
translating the perspective the other had seen (Perner 
1996). Such basic malfunctions of the imitative system 
may have profound effects on social development.
The imitation of hand actions is of particular 
importance in addressing the evolution of tool use. 
Imitation of the hands, and of tool use more generally, 
is a highly cognitively transparent task; tools can be 
used in identical ways for identical purposes by self 
and others and, more importantly, due to the position 
of the hands as relatively distal effectors, the visual 
stimulus provided by ‘you using a tool’ will look much 
like that of ‘me using a tool’. This has led Iriki to argue 
that ’tools become a medium for realizing equivalence 
among agents and of self­other compatibility‘ (Iriki 
2006, 663). She goes further to suggest that, via the 
bimodal neurons discussed earlier, agents are able to 
establish parity between body parts and tools, and that 
the flipside of this process enables us to objectify parts 
of the body, and eventually the self entirely.
Brains in context
As exciting as these new developments are, the 
neuroanatomical foundations of such changes in body 
plan and cognitive representation cannot be studied 
separately from a consideration of the particular 
contexts which might select for them. Interactions 
between individual agents and tools are necessarily 
inherently social in nature and so implicate a more 
inclusive level of analysis that takes into account the 
social context as well as the ontogenetic development 
of hominin technological evolution.
In fact, the developmental plasticity of the brain is 
considerable: it is argued that redundant architectonic 
information in the mammalian genome is minimized 
by a reliance on Darwinian processes to structure 
brain development (Deacon 1997). Transplantation 
experiments would seem to demonstrate that, rather 
than being genetically ‘hardwired’, much variation 
in the neuroanatomical connectivity of mammalian 
brains is achieved by overproduction of neurons and 
underspecification of axonal growth and connectiv-
ity, so that brain structures are established through 
a process of axonal competition for limited synaptic 
targets and programmed cell death for those that fail. 
In short, the young brain proliferates new connections, 
with only a subset surviving the selective effects of 
experience (Fig. 3; Donald 1991; Deacon 1997).
Most of the neurons we will ever have are 
already present at birth. Post­natal brain growth is 
largely due to a vast and rapid increase in the number 
of connections, a process which is highly adaptable to 
changing circumstances. Even within specific brain 
regions, the most electrically and metabolically active 
circuits — i.e. those used most — grow at the expense 
of others (Greenfield 1997, 110–15). As a result, there 
is considerable plasticity in intraspecies development, 
as demonstrated by the highly variable response to 
Figure 2. The development of internal simulation:  
(a) shows the scenario without simulation, where a 
stimulus S1 elicits activity in the sensory cortex s1, 
leading to a response decision r1 and, finally, the overt 
motor response R1. This response leads simply to the 
generation of a second stimulus S2, and so on. (b) The 
onset of simulation allows the likely effects of responses to 
given stimuli to be evaluated internally. (c) Ultimately, 
this leads to the possibility of internally simulating 
extended loops of responses and stimuli. (Redrawn after 
Hesslow 2002, 244.)
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brain injuries among children. For example, loss of 
left­hemisphere language circuits during childhood 
does not inevitably result in impaired language proc-
esses, as the brain structures involved parasitize on 
corresponding right hemisphere structures normally 
associated with spatial functions — to the latter’s detri-
ment (Wills 1993; Gibson 1996; Bradshaw 1997). 
Epigenetic influences on the brain are now known 
to occur pre- as well as post-natally, and ‘foetal pro-
gramming’ has recently become an important area of 
research in developmental biology (e.g. Barker 1998). In 
addition to metabolic disorders such as obesity, diabetes 
and cardiovascular disease and respiratory conditions 
such asthma (Barker 1998; Reynolds et al. 2001; Vickers 
et al. 2003), susceptibility to psychological conditions 
and brain disorders such as schizophrenia, depression 
and post-traumatic stress disorders have also been 
related to this dynamic relationship between genes 
and the environment (Holtman et al. 1999; Halligan et 
al. 2004; Yehuda et al. 2005).
Nor is such plastic reorganization and reworking 
of synapses limited to critical perinatal developmen-
tal periods, as was previously thought. The adult 
brain too is capable of dynamic structural change in 
response to trauma such as limb amputation, after 
injury or stroke — or even merely after extensive 
training. For example, the cortical sensory region 
region for the hand is known to expand and contract 
with demand even in adults (Merzenich 1987; Donald 
1991; Wills 1993; Bradshaw 1997; Greenfield 1997, 
115–18), and after loss of a finger, sensorimotor control 
of adjacent fingers is enhanced by ‘taking over’ the 
newly available areas. 
Controversially, continuing production of brain 
cells has also been identified in adults, with rates of 
neural regeneration strongly affected by environmen-
tal factors (Eriksson et al. 1998; Gage 2002; Gould & 
Gross 2002 — though see Rakic 2002 for arguments 
contra). Rates of regeneration in adult rats have been 
estimated at over 270,000 new brain cells a month 
(c. 9000 a day: Gould & Gross 2002), although research 
on humans (post-mortem) has suggested a much 
lower figure of around 500–1000 (Eriksson et al. 1998). 
Set against a total of c. 100 billion neurons and perhaps 
Figure 3. Brain growth through axonal competition and the effect of altered environmental input. (Redrawn after 
Deacon 1997, 208 fig. 7.6, 210 fig. 7.7.)
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ten times that number of glia in the average adult brain 
(Williams & Herrup 2001), with an average neuron 
loss of c. 9000 neurons a day (a rate increased by, for 
example, the use of alcohol and other drugs: Hefti 
2002), this is certainly a low figure. Nevertheless, it 
does argue for the continuing possibility of change 
in response to the environment in the adult brain, 
a conclusion strengthened by the presence of other 
processes also contributing to the brain’s ability to 
respond to the effects of experience. The process of 
myelination, for example, speeds up and makes more 
efficient the movement of impulses along nerves (e.g. 
Hardcastle 1976; Marieb 1991), and many brain struc-
tures are known to continue to myelinate well into 
adulthood (e.g. Giedd et al. 1996; Paus et al. 1999). 
The results of experience may also facilitate 
repeated behaviours: ‘once an impulse has succeeded 
in passing through a synapse the threshold to future 
excitation at that synapse is lowered. This means it is 
then easier for future impulses to pass through the 
synapse; they are facilitated’ (Hardcastle 1976, 8). 
Thus rehearsed actions set up proprioceptive feedback 
loops between the Central Nervous System — the 
brain — and the peripheral nervous system — the 
limbs — enabling very fast ‘mindless’ reactions with 
very little conscious effort (Craik 1947; Lashley 1951). 
The classic example of this is the ability of sportsmen 
and women to catch e.g. cricket/tennis balls despite 
the physical impossibility of processing the trajectory 
and velocity of the missile fast enough for an effective 
response to be made (e.g. Rose 1997). 
In short, environment has a huge effect on neu-
roanatomy, particularly during early development but 
throughout life. Neuroanatomists such as Kathleen 
Gibson have argued that in fact the plasticity of the 
mammalian brain in response to environmental input 
is so significant and integral to its functioning that 
they could well be considered bio-environmental or 
bio­social organs (Gibson 1996). 
In terms of primates and humans, it is obvious 
that both may exhibit quite different cognitive styles in 
different environmental circumstances. For example, 
apes raised in captivity are often capable of more 
complex linguistic, tool-using, imitative and mirror-
recognition behaviours than those reared in the wild. 
Similarly, many behaviours that are fundamental parts 
of modern human lives today were un-thought of even 
a century ago, such as driving cars, riding bicycles, 
using tin openers and playing computer games. All 
of these behaviours affect our thought processes with-
out being reliant on any recent change in the genes 
responsible for brain growth (Gibson 1996, 36) — for 
better or for worse (Greenfield 2008). 
This is not, however, a question of crowning 
nurture over nature. Experiments in bringing up 
chimpanzees alongside human children did not see 
them develop completely human cognitive styles (e.g. 
Hayes 1952). Rather, as Matt Ridley has argued (2003), 
the issue is one of nature via nurture, with both genetic 
and environmental factors playing a part. For exam-
ple, the young of many mammals must be exposed to 
light during the first few weeks after their eyes have 
opened for those structures of the brain subserving 
light reception to develop. After this period, the 
animals can no longer become sighted (Ridley 2003, 
164–5; see also Greenfield 1997, 114). A similar critical 
period is thought to exist for language acquisition 
among humans; children not exposed to language 
during this period never acquire fluent language 
skills (e.g. Hurford 1991; Lightfoot 1999; Komarova 
& Nowak 2001). A genetic underspecification of brain 
development and ‘final’ structure is therefore clearly 
the result of natural selection: a selection, it has been 
suggested, for rapid adaptive responses to environ-
mental change (e.g. Deacon 1997).
The ‘channelling’ properties of the environment, 
therefore — and not simply the natural environment 
but also the technological and social environment 
— are a significant structuring element in terms of 
brain development and adult cognitive style. 
Hominin life history and its social ramifications
Humans demonstrate some very distinctive develop-
mental characteristics that could inform on the evolu-
tion of this flexibility of neuroanatomical response to 
the environment. Among mammals more generally, 
two distinct developmental styles can be determined 
among mammals, who can be divided between those 
with altricial young, born in relatively large litters in a 
less­developed state after a relatively short gestation, 
and those with precocial young — usually singletons 
or twins born after a relatively long gestation who 
are well developed and able to locomote soon after 
birth. Primates as a whole are a precocial order — but, 
interestingly, one with delayed motor development. In 
modern humans, this motor delay is so extreme that 
we have been dubbed ‘secondarily altricial’. It takes 
a human neonate a year to reach the stage of motor 
development equivalent to those of a newborn great 
ape (Fig. 4; Smith & Tompkins 1995).
In terms of brain growth, while the brains of apes 
in general are 40 per cent of adult size at birth and 80 
per cent at one year, the brains of human neonates are 
25 per cent of adult size and only 50 per cent at one 
year old. By four years old, when a chimpanzee’s brain 
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reaches adult size, human brain size is still only 84.1 
per cent of full size — even at age 10, there is still some 
5 per cent of growth remaining. It is not until around 
the age 16 that the brain reaches its maximum size 
(Foley & Lee 1991; Smith & Tompkins 1995; Coqueu-
gniot et al. 2004). Of course, correlations between brain 
size and crude measures of intelligence such as IQ 
remain weak (e.g. Rushton & Ankney 1996; Simonton 
1999; Heilman et al. 2003), although certain measures 
of brain volume (particularly that of the ‘executive 
brain’, the combined volumes of the neocortex and 
striatum) do appear to correlate positively with cross-
species frequencies of social learning, innovation 
and tool use (Reader & Laland 2002). Such findings 
indicate that cognitive flexibility, a hallmark of mod-
ern human cognition, may be influenced by both the 
evolutionary and ontogenetic growth trajectories of 
specific brain areas. However, the costs, benefits and 
ramifications of encephalization per se are discussed 
in detail elsewhere (Barrickman et al. 2008; Aiello & 
Dunbar 1993; Coward & Grove submitted). For the 
purposes of our argument here, the significance of 
the distinctively human pattern of brain growth lies 
rather in its relative timing and impact on cognitive 
development.
While in most mammals the brain grows at 
its fastest in utero, with rates dropping off sharply 
after birth, among primates high foetal growth rates 
continue after birth (Smith & Tompkins 1995). But for 
chimpanzees and macaques this rapid growth lasts 
for only about a month or so after birth, while human 
neonates maintain it for a full year. This is not a result 
of shorter gestation; humans have absolutely and 
relatively long gestations and large neonates for body 
weight, and energetic investment in gestation is about 
average for a primate of our size (Smith & Tompkins 
1995). It is really only postnatal costs that exceed 
those of the more precocial chimpanzee neonate: the 
energetic cost of the brain of modern humans is some 
three times that of chimpanzees overall (Foley & Lee 
1991).
An extended period of immaturity necessarily 
entails significant costs that would seem on the face 
of it to reduce overall reproductive fitness; as Joffe 
has detailed (1997), energetic and time costs lower 
maternal reproductive rates, while the offspring 
themselves delay reproduction and must negotiate 
the most dangerous portion of their lifespan for longer 
(among primates juvenile mortality is much higher 
than adult). Clearly, there must be some considerable 
adaptive benefit to the extended period of immaturity 
seen among primates and particularly humans. 
The main hypothesis forwarded as to the nature 
of these benefits suggests that an extended juvenile 
phase of life allows the acquisition of the large body 
of knowledge and skills that must be acquired prior 
to adulthood among species with highly complex 
social and foraging skills. Joffe’s review of the evidence 
(1997) favoured the prior explanation, concluding that 
in contrast to social skills, foraging skills appeared to 
be acquired relatively easily and quickly by juvenile 
primates (see also Barrickman et al. 2008, 581). It 
is debatable how far social and foraging skills can 
really be separated out from one another, particularly 
among modern humans, whose complex hunting 
practices rarely reach peak efficiency until at least 
maturity (Barrickman et al. 2008, 581; see also Coward 
& Gamble 2008; MacDonald 2007; Coward & Grove 
submitted).
Nor is an extended period of immaturity and 
growth among humans matched by a residual enlarge-
ment of body size relative to other primates; it has been 
suggested, therefore, that humans can be regarded as 
growth suppressed during most of their development, 
with the adolescent human growth spurt representing 
catch­up growth at sexual maturity. There is some 
controversy as to whether this is a uniquely human 
characteristic, but at the very least it is clear that the 
human adolescent growth spurt is significantly more 
pronounced than that of non­human primates (Bogin 
1999). The most plausible explanation for this is argued 
to be a prolongation of ‘young’ physical form to elicit 
parental behaviour — care rather than competition 
— from adults (Smith & Tompkins 1995).
The significance of this rescheduling of brain 
growth and development thus lies in the fact that, 
unlike other primates, most human brain growth 
takes place while the individual is already interact-
Figure 4. Human motor development milestones. 
(Redrawn after the Introductory Psychology Image Bank: 
(http://www.mhhe.com/socscience/intro/ibank/set1.htm.)
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ing with the extra­maternal environment. Given the 
significant role of epigenetic factors in ontogenetic 
brain development discussed above, this prolonged 
post-natal growth period massively extends the time-
frame during which the selective effects of experience 
of the physical and social environment can impact on 
processes of brain development (e.g. Coqueugniot et 
al. 2004) including synaptic competition and pruning, 
myelination and facilitation. A relative underspecifi-
cation of brain development clearly also necessitates 
highly developed learning abilities among species 
occupying niches reliant on complex foraging and 
social skills: cognitive evolution in general has been 
argued to be driven by selection for increased learning 
abilities, particularly as regards novel manual skills 
in feeding contexts which would enable species to 
process more difficult foodstuffs (Byrne 2007). 
Such an increased focus on learning undoubtedly 
impacts on the complexity and cultural transmission 
of technological skills such as lithic manufacture and 
use. Underpinned by a primate heritage of the basic 
cognitive mechanisms discussed in the first half of this 
paper, the extended juvenile period among humans 
allows for absolutely more time for cognitive devel-
opment in the face of environmental (both social and 
ecological) stimuli which relate to their capabilities for 
learning the relevant skills for a niche characterized by 
extreme flexibility in the face of ecological variability 
(Coward & Grove submitted). In a recent review of 
the anthropological literature, of 24 case studies where 
information was available on the length of time it took 
to master craft skills, all but six required longer than 
one year, and more than half (14 cases) took more than 
five (Hosfield in press). 
Furthermore, this complexity of technology 
relates not only to changes in life history discussed 
above, but also to associated developments in hominin 
sociality. The necessary changes in developmental and 
life history strategy may be highly adaptive — but, 
crucially, they can only occur as part of a constellation 
of other behaviours. Increased parental care is clearly 
vital as larger brains require high-quality, protein-rich 
diets in early development, and given already high 
levels of investment in offspring by mothers, the 
extra investment must come from elsewhere, be that 
pair­bonded males or older relatives. It is interesting 
to note that the prolongation of life spans beyond 
reproductive stages makes little sense outside a way of 
life where the handing down of complex skills learnt 
over a lifetime is adaptive (Fig. 5; Peccei 1995; Hawkes 
et al. 1998; O’Connell et al. 1999). 
While this article focuses on lithics, the argu-
ments extend to other technological domains and 
skilled behaviours: for example, complex hunting and 
gathering and food­processing practices. This observa-
tion brings us full circle, as more sophisticated forag-
ing and processing skills and more complex social 
networks for food-sharing and care-giving allowed 
hominins to target even higher quality resources 
such as meat more efficiently, further fuelling brain 
expansion and development and creating positive 
feedback/ratcheting effects between the costs and 
benefits of encephalization and altered life­histories 
(see e.g. Aiello & Wheeler 1995; Barrickman et al. 
2008; Kaplan et al. 2000; Coward & Grove submitted). 
Although it may seem blatantly obvious, it is worth 
emphasizing the point that simple linear causalities 
are unlikely to be sufficient for investigating the evolu-
tion of human cognition.
Locating the changes in hominin evolution
Evidence for developmental histories is of course dif-
ficult to assess in the fossil record of extinct hominin 
species. Pelvic inlet size and cranial capacity of fossil 
hominin and hominid species are of particular inter-
est here. Of course, head size at birth is not a direct 
measure of learning-dependency and/or life-history; 
nevertheless, as discussed above, the trade­off between 
the adaptive constraints of pelvic size/parturitional 
mortality and the benefits of encephalization are 
particularly important variables in the constellation of 
physical and social adaptations that combine to make 
human cognition unique. Comparisons of the pelvic 
inlet size and cranial size are thus salient markers of 
the degree to which the derived pattern of human 
development — longer, slower, brain maturation in 
Figure 5. Hominoid life histories. Positive scale is in 
years, negative scale in weeks. (Redrawn after Schultz 
1969, 149.)
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more complex social environments — had established 
itself among fossil hominin populations.
 On this basis, the balance of evidence currently 
suggests that Homo erectus is the locus of many of these 
changes. The pelves of Australopithecus afarensis speci-
mens are sufficiently spacious that selective pressure for 
secondary altriciality seems unlikely (Smith & Tomp-
kins 1995) given cranial capacities not significantly 
greater than those of living hominoid apes (Foley & 
Lee 1991), although the robust australopithecines have 
yielded confusing results perhaps related to their highly 
specialized dental adaptations (Smith & Tompkins 
1995). In contrast, the large brain and reduced pelvic 
inlet of Neanderthals are very similar in dimensions 
to those of modern humans and suggest similar pat-
terns of perinatal growth (Foley & Lee 1991; Smith & 
Tompkins 1995; Coqueugniot et al. 2004). 
Sadly, lack of evidence precludes viable reconstruc-
tion of Homo habilis’s development (Smith & Tompkins 
1995), although it has been noted that encephalization 
— a characteristic of the genus Homo particularly — is 
likely to require a shift towards secondary altriciality 
(Foley & Lee 1991). But it is the data from Homo erectus 
which is most interesting. Although the pelvis from 
Nariokotome is very narrow compared to modern 
humans, this specimen is that of a juvenile male (Smith 
& Tompkins 1995). In contrast, the Mojokerto Homo 
erectus child from Java, estimated to have been around 
1 year old at death, has an endocranial capacity of 
72–84 per cent adult size, arguing for a rapid ‘ape­like’ 
rather than slow modern human pattern of postnatal 
brain development. The conflict between the dental 
and skeletal age of the Nariokotome skeleton could 
also suggest that the derived modern human pattern of 
delayed childhood growth followed by an adolescent 
growth spurt had not yet become established in Homo 
erectus (Smith & Tompkins 1995), although Foley & 
Lee have argued that all members of the genus Homo 
display extended maturation, being dentally advanced 
for a given chronological age (Foley & Lee 1991). Nev-
ertheless, Homo erectus has very modern human-like 
limb dimensions and was thus probably fully bipedal, 
which may imply that pelvic constraints were exercis-
ing some selective pressure on birth­size and thus 
delaying maturity (O’Connell et al. 1999). 
Given a strong correlation between brain size 
and longevity among primates, it also seems likely 
that the increased size of Homo erectus’s brain was 
associated with an increased lifespan. The link 
between increasing maternal body size and delayed 
maturity also argues for Homo erectus as a break point 
in developmental schedules — estimated Homo erectus 
body weights of 55–60 kg are a 55 per cent increase (70 
per cent for females alone) on the c. 35–40 kg average 
among australopithecines (O’Connell et al. 1999). 
Some of the behavioural and social correlates of 
changing life histories can also perhaps be detected in 
the archaeological record associated with Homo erectus. 
A larger body size is highly correlated with the broader 
foraging range necessary for exploiting the patchier 
high-quality foods which allow an increase in brain 
size. Similarly, a smaller thoracic capacity suggests a 
simpler gut as a result of a shift to a higher­quality diet 
requiring less gastric processing — resulting in more 
metabolic energy available for encephalization (Aiello 
& Wheeler 1995; O’Connell et al. 1999). The earliest 
evidence for such a dietary shift — the faunal remains 
of large animals, often with cutmarks — appears in 
the archaeological record of Homo erectus (Foley & 
Lee 1991). Evidence for larger site sizes, more diverse 
assemblages and the exploitation of a broader range 
of habitats and wider geographical spread at around 
this time (Homo erectus is the first hominin to appear 
outside Africa, as far north as Georgia) would also 
seem to point towards increasing behavioural flex-
ibility, perhaps relating to the development of modern 
developmental histories in which longer juvenile 
periods were adaptive because of the ways in which 
longer-term immersion in highly social post-natal 
environments could influence epigenetic development 
of cognitive mechanisms derived from our primate 
cognitive heritage and enable individuals to learn the 
skills associated with more and more complex social 
and ecological niches.
These physical, skeletally­based lines of evidence 
are not immediately linked to the changes in neurons 
and brains we surmise occurred during hominiza-
tion. Nevertheless, they do represent convenient and 
informative ways in to the constellation of physical 
and social adaptations without which the develop-
ments underpinning modern human cognition could 
not have occurred — and it is with Homo erectus that 
we can begin to see some of the many necessary devel-
opments come together in something that begins to 
resemble the derived modern human lifeway.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we have argued here that cognition 
cannot simply be identified at the level of the indi-
vidual neuronal system or even the individual brain. 
The brain cannot be separated from the body; the 
sensory and motor modalities that structure primate 
life and cognitive and technological achievement are 
the property of both central and peripheral cognitive 
and motor systems. 
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Nor can individual agents — brains in bodies 
— be separated out from one another. Mirror neurons 
potentially provide a mechanism by which individu-
als structure their social interactions through an innate 
cognitive equivalence of physical actions by oneself 
and by others. The manufacture and use of tools 
provides a further means by which individuals may 
associate with one another: imitation or outright teach-
ing of knapping behaviours will necessarily encourage 
cognitive empathy. Not only do tools extend the body 
schema of the individual, but through exchange and 
re-use among hominins, they encourage the percep-
tion of self-other equivalence, together with the 
observation of those important differences that exist 
between individuals.
The individual brain, then, is shaped by its 
embodied experience of the world and by the other 
embodied brains around it from a very early stage. 
New developments in neuroscience are now begin-
ning to allow us to address the functional neuroanat-
omy of the individual brain, with huge potential for 
addressing the neural bases of the behaviours we see 
in the 2.6 million years of the archaeological record. 
Equally, these new developments are highlighting the 
complexity of the linkages between brain and body, 
as well as those between individuals and between 
individuals and the social and physical environments 
in which they are immersed. We must choose our level 
of analysis with care.
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